Bargaining over Collusion Profits under Cost Asymmetry and Demand Uncertainty by Saglam, Ismail
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Bargaining over Collusion Profits under
Cost Asymmetry and Demand
Uncertainty
Ismail Saglam
Ankara, Turkey
21 January 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84007/
MPRA Paper No. 84007, posted 22 January 2018 06:46 UTC
Bargaining over Collusion Profits under Cost
Asymmetry and Demand Uncertainty
Ismail Saglam
Ankara, Turkey
Abstract. In this paper we borrow from Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012)
a duopolistic industry structure with cost asymmetry and demand uncertainty,
and using this structure we build a bargaining model to study the division of
collusion profits –obtained from the joint selection of supply functions– under
the possibility of side payments. In our model, we consider potential disagree-
ment points obtained from the non-cooperative equilibrium of either the quan-
tity competition or the supply function competition, and potential bargaining
solutions splitting the gains from agreement either equally or proportionally
according to the relative disagreement payoffs of the duopolists. Given any of
these disagreement points and any of these bargaining solutions, we find that
each duopolist has always incentive to join a collusive agreement. On the other
hand, irrespective of whether the bargaining solution splits the gains from agree-
ment equally or proportionally respecting the relative disagreement payoffs, the
more efficient firm (the less efficient firm) in the cartel always obtains a higher
agreement payoff when the disagreement point is obtained from the equilibrium
of supply function competition (quantity competition). Given the studied dis-
agreement points and bargaining solutions, we also find that bargaining over
collusion profits always makes the more efficient firm worse off and the less
efficient firm better off in comparison to a collusive agreement equalizing the
marginal costs of these two firms.
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tion competition; uncertainty
JEL Codes: D43; L13
1
1 Introduction
A voluminous literature has extensively studied the basic problem of oligopolis-
tic cartels as to how to divide collusion profits under cost asymmetries. While
a strand of this literature followed Patinkin’s (1947) efficiency concern that the
cartel should allocate the collusive outcome to equalize the marginal costs of
oligopolists, another strand accepted Bain’s (1948) criticism that the division of
collusion profits must respect the relative bargaining power of the oligopolists
obtained from the threat of playing their non-cooperative equilibrium strate-
gies (see, for example, Osborne and Pitchik, 1983, and Schmalansee, 1987).
On the other hand, both strands of literature have mainly focused on types of
collusion where the oligopolistic firms compete in prices or in quantities. An
exception is the recent work of Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012), which al-
lows collusive firms in a duopolistic industry to compete in supply functions,
as well. However, since that type of competition may yield uncountably many
equilibria in deterministic environments (as shown by Grossman, 1981), Cia-
rreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012) had to ensure the uniqueness of equilibrium
by allowing in their model for the possibility of demand uncertainty as well,
a remedy which was earlier proposed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989). One of
the results Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012) obtained from their sophisticated
model suggests that the less efficient firm has no incentive to reach a collusive
agreement in either supply functions or in quantities when the cost asymmetry
in the duopoly is sufficiently high, because in that case the expected profits
of this firm are higher at the non-cooperative equilibria of these two types of
competition. This result, though quite interesting, may not be general, as it is
based on the assumed impossibility of side payments between duopolists, forcing
them to share the collusive outcome according to cost efficiency considerations.
In this paper we replace this assumption with an opposite assumption that al-
lows for side payments between the duopolists, enabling them to freely bargain
over collusion profits within the cooperative framework of Nash (1950b).
In our bargaining model, the bargaining set consists of all possible (not
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necessarily efficient) divisions of the collusion profits obtained from the joint se-
lection of supply functions of the duopolists. Given a bargaining set, we consider
potential disagreement points obtained from the non-cooperative equilibrium of
either the quantity competition or the supply function competition, and poten-
tial bargaining solutions splitting the gains from agreement either equally or
proportionally according to the relative disagreement payoffs of the duopolists.
Given any of these disagreement points and any of these bargaining solutions,
we find that each duopolist has always incentive to join a collusive agreement.
On the other hand, irrespective of whether the bargaining solution splits the
gains from agreement equally or proportionally respecting the relative disagree-
ment payoffs, the more efficient firm (the less efficient firm) in the cartel always
obtains a higher agreement payoff when the disagreement point is obtained from
the equilibrium of supply function competition (quantity competition). Given
the studied disagreement points and bargaining solutions, we also find that bar-
gaining over collusion profits always makes the more efficient firm worse off and
the less efficient firm better off in comparison to a collusive agreement equalizing
the marginal costs of these two firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present some
preliminaries, involving the duopolistic model of Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita
(2012) and some of their results relevant for our purpose. Using these prelim-
inaries, we construct in Section 3 a bargaining model for collusive duopolists.
Section 4 contains our results and Section 5 concludes. Finally, the Appendix
contains the proofs of all results in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
We will present here the duopolistic industry structure considered by Ciarreta
and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012) along with some of their results that will be relevant
for our bargaining model and results in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. This
structure involves a duopolistic industry model with a single homogeneous good
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produced under the possibility of cost asymmetry and demand uncertainty. The
duopolistic firms have quadratic cost functions such that firm i = 1, 2 producing
a quantity of output qi ≥ 0 incurs the cost
Ci(qi) = (1 + θi(c)) q
2
i/2, (1)
where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 and
θi(c) =
 −c if i = 1,+c if i = 2, (2)
implying that firm 1 is (generally) more efficient than firm 2. The industry
demand curve is given by
D(p, α(µ)) = α(µ)− p, (3)
where p ≥ 0 is the market price of the good and α(µ) is a scalar random variable
that takes the values 1−µ and 1+µ with equal probability.1 It is assumed that
0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. The distribution of α(µ), the curves C(q) and D(p, α(µ)), and the
ranges of the parameters c and µ are all common knowledge.
2.1 Two Types of Competition
For the duopolistic industry described above, two types of competition will
be considered. In one of the types, the duopolistic firms compete in supply
functions. That is, a strategy for firm i = 1, 2 is to non-cooperatively choose -
before it learns the realization of the demand uncertainty α(µ)- a linear function
mapping price into a quantity of output, i.e., Si = vip where vi ≥ 0.2 Given
1In Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012), α(µ) can take (with equal probability) the values
α − µ and α + µ, where α ∈ R+. We set α = 1 because the parameter α does not affect our
results qualitatively.
2In Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012), the supply functions are affinely linear; however, in
both collusive and non-cooperative equilibria the constant part of the supply function equals
zero for each firm. Given this fact, in order to simplify the notation and analysis, we will
proceed with linear supply functions.
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the supply functions of the firms, the market clears at a realization α(µ) of the
demand uncertainty if
D(p(α(µ)), α(µ)) = S1(p(α(µ)) + S2(p(α(µ)) = (v1 + v2)p(α(µ)). (4)
So, inserting (3) into (4) yields the market clearing price
p(α(µ), v1, v2) =
α(µ)
1 + v1 + v2
. (5)
We say that a pair of linear supply functions (S∗1 (p), S
∗
2 (p)) = (v
∗
1p, v
∗
2p) consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950a) if for each i = 1, 2 the function S∗i (p)
maximizes the expected profits of firm i when the remaining firm j 6= i pro-
duces according to its supply function S∗j (p). Formally, this implies that for
each i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i, the parameter v∗i solves
max
vi≥0
1
2
∑
α(µ)
[
p(α(µ), vi, v
∗
j )S
∗
i (p(α(µ), vi, v
∗
j ))−
(1 + θi(c))
(
S∗i (p(α(µ), vi, v
∗
j )
)2
/2
]
. (6)
Proposition 1 (Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita, 2012). Competition in linear
supply functions has a unique Nash equilibrium characterized by S∗i (p) = v
∗
i p
for each i = 1, 2, where
v∗i =
1
2
(
v(c)− 2θi(c)
3− c2 − 1
)
, (7)
with
v(c) =
√
45− c2(14− c2). (8)
At this equilibrium, the expected profits of firm i = 1, 2 are given by
piSi (c, µ) =
1 + µ2
4
(
(9− c2) + θi(c)(5− c2)
v(c)
− (1 + θi(c))
)
. (9)
Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium supply function of the more ef-
ficient firm (firm 1) in the duopoly is always steeper. Therefore, the more
efficient firm always has higher output and expected profits in equilibrium. On
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the other hand, demand uncertainty affects the two firms in the same direction:
the equilibrium expected profits of both firms become higher when the demand
uncertainty becomes higher.
The second type of competition we will consider is the well-known quantity
competition of Cournot (1838). Under this competition, a strategy for firm
i = 1, 2 is to choose –before it learns the realization of the demand uncertainty
α(µ)– a fixed quantity of output, qi ≥ 0. Given the quantities chosen by the
firms, the market clears at a realization α(µ) of the demand uncertainty if
D(p(α(µ)), α(µ)) = q1 + q2. (10)
Inserting the demand equation (3) into (10) yields the market clearing price
p(α(µ), q1, q2) = α(µ)− q1 − q2. (11)
We say that a pair of quantities (q∗1 , q
∗
2) constitutes a (Cournot) Nash equilib-
rium if for each i = 1, 2 the quantity q∗i maximizes the expected profits of firm i
when the remaining firm j 6= i produces according to the quantity q∗j . Formally,
for each i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i, the quantity q∗i solves
max
qi≥0
1
2
∑
α(µ)
[
p(α(µ), qi, q
∗
j )qi − (1 + θi(c)) qi2/2
]
. (12)
Proposition 2 (Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita, 2012). Competition in quan-
tities has a unique (Cournot) Nash equilibrium characterized by
q∗i (c) =
(
2− θi(c)
8− c2
)
, i = 1, 2. (13)
At this equilibrium, the expected profits of firm i = 1, 2 are given by
piCi (c) =
1
2
[
(3 + θi(c))(2− θi(c))2
(8− c2)2
]
. (14)
The above proposition shows that under the quantity competition, the more
efficient firm always produces more in comparison to the less efficient firm, like
in the supply function competition; hence, it obtains higher expected profits
in equilibrium. However, unlike under the supply function competition, the
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expected profits of the duopolistic firms are independent of the demand uncer-
tainty under the quantity competition. One may immediately ask whether any
of these two competitions can always yield more expected profits to the more ef-
ficient firm or to the less efficient firm in the duopoly. We will give a non-trivial
answer to this question in Section 4.
2.2 Two Types of Collusion
We will now consider two types of collusion. According to the first type, the
duopolistic cartel chooses the linear supply functions of the two firms jointly to
maximize the industry (cartel) profits. Let piI(α(µ), v1, v2) denote the industry
profits at the demand realization α(µ) when the supply functions chosen by the
cartel for firm 1 and firm 2 are S1(p) = v1p and S2(p) = v2p respectively. These
profits can be calculated as
piI(α(µ), v1, v2) =
∑
i=1,2
[
p(α(µ), v1, v2)Si(p(α(µ), vi))−
(1 + θi(c)) (Si(p(α(µ), vi))
2
/2
]
, (15)
where p(α(µ), v1, v2) is given by (5). We say that a pair of supply functions,
(Sˆ1(p), Sˆ2(p)) = (vˆ1p, vˆ2p), leads to collusion if for all i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i
the parameter vˆi solves
max
vi≥0
1
2
∑
α(µ)
piI(α(µ), vi, vˆj). (16)
Proposition 3 (Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita, 2012). Collusion in linear
supply functions arises only if Sˆi(p) = vˆip for each i = 1, 2, where
vˆi =
1− θi(c)
3− c2 . (17)
Under this collusion, the expected industry profits are equal to
piI,S−Col(c, µ) =
1 + µ2
5− c2 . (18)
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Moreover, if the output is allocated between the firms to equalize their marginal
costs, then the expected profits of firm i = 1, 2 become
piS−Coli (c, µ) =
1 + µ2
2
[
1− θi(c)
5− c2
]
. (19)
Note in the above proposition that the supply curve chosen by the duopolis-
tic cartel for the more efficient firm is always steeper than the supply curve
chosen for the less efficient firm. Consequently, the output allocated to, and the
expected profits obtained by, the more efficient firm in the cartel are higher. On
the other hand, the expected profits of both firms are increasing in the size of
demand uncertainty.
Now, we will consider the type of collusion where the duopolistic cartel
chooses the fixed quantities of the two firms jointly to maximize the industry
profits. Let piI(α(µ), q1, q2) denote the industry profits at the demand realization
α(µ) when the quantities chosen for firm 1 and firm 2 are q1 and q2 respectively.
Then, we must have
piI(α(µ), q1, q2) =
2∑
i=1
[
(α(µ)− q1 − q2)qi − (1 + θi)q2i /2
]
. (20)
We say that a pair of quantities, (qˆ1, qˆ2), leads to collusion if for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}
with j 6= i the quantity qˆi solves
max
qi≥0
1
2
∑
α(µ)
piI(α(µ), qi, qˆj). (21)
Proposition 4 (Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita, 2012). Collusion in quanti-
ties arises only if for each i = 1, 2 the quantity of output produced by firm i is
equal to
qC−Coli (c) =
1− θi(c)
5− c2 . (22)
Under this collusion, the expected industry profits are always given by
piI,C−Col(c) =
1
5− c2 . (23)
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Moreover, if the output is allocated between the two firms to equalize their
marginal costs, then the expected profits of firm i = 1, 2 become
piC−Coli (c) =
1
2
[
1− θi(c)
5− c2
]
. (24)
The above proposition shows that -like in the case of collusion in supply
functions- the output allocated to, and the expected profits obtained by, the
more efficient firm in the cartel are always higher. Comparing Propositions 3
and 4, we also observe that the expected profits of each firm, hence the industry
profits, are always higher when the cartel commits to supply functions, instead
of quantities, provided that there is any size of demand uncertainty.
3 The Model
Using the duopolistic industry presented above, Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita
(2012) studied the formation and stability of a collusive agreement (or a cartel).
However, they only considered agreements without side payments, and following
the suggestion of Patinkin (1947) they restricted themselves to collusive alloca-
tions that equalize the duopolists’ marginal costs of production. In this paper,
we will get rid of this restriction and study the problem of dividing collusion
profits under the possibility of bargaining with side payments. We will formu-
late this division problem using the two-person cooperative bargaining model of
Nash (1950), where the two persons, namely the duopolists in our problem, are
allowed to choose a payoff allocation in a bargaining set of payoffs according to
any rule they agree upon.
Formally, in the bargaining model of Nash (1950), a bargaining set is any
nonempty subset of R2+, representing von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities at-
tainable through the cooperative actions of two agents. Given any bargaining
set S ∈ R2+, a point d = (d1, d2) in S is called the disagreement point. If the
two persons fail to agree on any point in S, then they receive the gains d1 and
d2 respectively. The bargaining set S and a disagreement point d in this set to-
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gether define a bargaining problem. It is assumed that S is compact and convex
and there exists x ∈ S such that x ≥ d.3 In addition, S is d-comprehensive (al-
lowing free disposal of utility); that is, for all x, y ∈ R2+, if x ∈ S and x ≥ y ≥ d,
then y ∈ S. Let WP (S) denote the set of weakly Pareto optimal points in S;
i.e. WP (S) = {y ∈ S : if x > y, then x /∈ S}, and let P (S) denote the set of
(strongly) Pareto optimal points in S; i.e. P (S) = {y ∈ S : if x ≥ y, then x /∈ S}.
Given the above assumptions and definitions, let Σ2+ denote the set of all two-
person bargaining problems with a non-negative disagreement point. We can
now formulate the bargaining problem between the firms in a duopolistic cartel.
First, we will construct the bargaining set for this cartel. Here, we assume that
the two firms jointly choose -among the two alternatives in Section 2.2- the type
of collusion that yields the highest industry profits. Comparison of Propositions
3 and 4 to this end immediately reveals that the two firms, when they desire
to form a cartel, should always choose to collude in supply functions since the
expected profits of the cartel would be never lower under that type of collusion
and would be always higher as long as there is any uncertainty in demand. Thus,
for the rest of this study, we assume that the expected collusion profits to be
shared by the duopolistic firms are equal to piI,S−Col(c, µ), satisfying equation
(18), for any c ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. We will denote this profit level by piI(c, µ).
Since any division of collusion profits is allowed under the possibility of side
payments, for any c and µ in [0, 1] the corresponding bargaining set S(c, µ) must
be equal to {s1, s2 ∈ R2+ : 0 ≤ s1+s2 ≤ piI(c, µ)}. Note that S(c, µ) always has a
linear frontier, i.e. P (S(c, µ)) = WP (S(c, µ)). Also, S(c, µ) is always compact,
convex, and also d-comprehensive given any d ∈ S(c, µ). Let us denote by Σ2,D+
the set of all problems (S(c, µ), d) in Σ2+ faced by the duopolistic firms for some
c and µ in [0, 1]. Clearly, Σ2,D+ ⊂ Σ2+.
Given the definition for bargaining problems, a solution F on Σ2+ is a map-
ping from Σ2+ to R2+ such that for any (S, d) ∈ Σ2+, F (S, d) ∈ S. (Given the
solution point F (S, d), we will denote by Fi(S, d) the payoff of firm i = 1, 2.)
3Given two vectors x and y in R2+, x > y means xi > yi for i = 1, 2 and x ≥ y means
xi ≥ yi for i = 1, 2.
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Obviously, there exist uncountably many solutions on Σ2+. However, we will
only consider solutions that will divide up the cartel’s gains from agreement
either always equally or always proportionally according to the ratio of the
disagreement payoffs. To formally describe these solutions, we say that
(i) a bargaining solution F on Σ2+ is called the Equal Split solution on Σ
2,D
+ if
for any c ∈ [0, 1], µ ∈ [0, 1], and d ∈ S(c, µ) it satisfies
Fi(S(c, µ), d)− di = 1
2
[piI(c, µ)− d1 − d2], i = 1, 2, (25)
(ii) a bargaining solution F on Σ2+ is called the d-Proportional Split solution on
Σ2,D+ if for any c ∈ [0, 1], µ ∈ [0, 1], and d ∈ S(c, µ) it satisfies
Fi(S(c, µ), d)− di = φi(d) [piI(c, µ)− d1 − d2], i = 1, 2, (26)
where
φi(d) =

1
2
if d1 + d2 = 0,
di
d1 + d2
if 0 < d1 + d2 ≤ piI(c, µ).
(27)
In the oligopoly literature, the solution that splits the gains from agreement
equally was referred by Schmalansee (1987) as the Equal Gains solution of Roth
(1979) while he was dealing with problems where the bargaining sets are linear
and the disagreement point is set to the Nash equilibrium payoffs obtained under
the quantity (Cournot) competition, whereas for similar problems the solution
that splits the gains from agreement d-proportionally was referred by Fischer
and Normann (2016) as the Equal Relative Gains solution of Roth (1979). One
can check that many well known solutions, including the Nash (1950) solution,
the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) solution, and the Egalitarian solution (Kalai,
1977) among others, reduce to the Equal Split solution on Σ2,D+ . One can also
check that both the Equal Split and the Proportional Split solution can be
obtained from some members of the class of reference function solutions, defined
and characterized by Anbarci (1995).
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In the next section, we will study the implications of using the Equal Split
and d-Proportional Split solutions in dividing up the collusion profits. For
notational simplicity, we will sometimes use S, piS , piC , and piI in place of
S(c, µ), piS(c, µ), piC(c), and piI(c, µ), respectively.
4 Results
The bargaining model constructed in the previous section requires the duopolis-
tic firms to determine a disagreement point in their bargaining set. The charac-
terization results of Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012), presented in Section 2,
suggest two natural candidates: The expected profits obtained by the duopolis-
tic firms from the supply function competition, piS , and from the Cournot com-
petition, piC . The firms may agree upon using any of these equilibrium points
as a disagreement (status quo) point d, provided that they mutually believe
that if an agreement fails to occur, each firm will be playing its non-cooperative
strategy at the equilibrium strategy profile inducing the payoffs at d. Below, we
will show that, for all values of the parameters c and µ, the payoff allocations
piS(c, µ) and piC(c) are always inside the bargaining set S(c, µ).
Lemma 1. For any c ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], if d ∈ {piS(c, µ), piC(c)} then
d ∈ S(c, µ)\WP (S(c, µ)).
Lemma 1 shows that each of the points piS(c, µ) and piC(c) is admissible as a
disagreement point. However, it also implies that neither of these points can be
selected by any bargaining solution that satisfies efficiency, i.e., that leaves no
part of the collusion profits undistributed between the duopolists. This lemma
has a direct implication on the formation of a collusive agreement.
Theorem 1. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to either the Equal Split
solution or the d-Proportional Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Then, for any c ∈ [0, 1],
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µ ∈ [0, 1], and d ∈ {piS(c, µ), piC(c)) each duopolist has incentive to collude un-
der the solution F , i.e., Fi(S(c, µ), d) > di for each i = 1, 2.
We should note that given a disagreement point d, both the Equal Split so-
lution and the d-Proportional Split solution offer to each duopolist a bargaining
payoff which is equal to its disagreement payoff plus a positive fraction of the
gains from agreement piI(c, µ)−d1−d2. So, Theorem 1 can be valid if and only
if for all values of the parameters c and µ the gains from agreement are positive
both when d = piS(c, µ) and when d = piC(c). Lemma 1 ensures that this is
indeed the case, since neither of these two potential disagreement points is on
the weak Pareto frontier of S(c, µ).
We should recall that in case the bargaining between the duopolistic firms
fails, each firm gains its disagreement payoff irrespective of the bargaining so-
lution. Given this, our next concern is to compare the disagreement payoffs of
each duopolist induced by the potential disagreement points piS(c, µ) and piC(c).
To this aim, we will first compare piS1 (c, µ)− piC1 (c) and piS2 (c, µ)− piC2 (c) in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any µ in [0, 1], piS1 (c, µ) − piC1 (c) = piS2 (c, µ) − piC2 (c) if c = 0
and piS1 (c, µ)− piC1 (c) > piS2 (c, µ)− piC2 (c) if c ∈ (0, 1].
Lemma 2 shows that if the disagreement point is changed from piC(c) to
piS(c, µ), the absolute gain –obtained when the bargaining fails– becomes higher
for the firm which is more efficient. Noticing that the inequality in this lemma
can be rewritten as piS1 (c, µ) − piS2 (c, µ) > piC1 (c) − piC2 (c), one can also observe
that as long as there exists cost asymmetry, the welfare inequality between the
duopolists is always higher under the supply function competition. Lemma 2
will be instrumental to prove the next lemma where we will deal with the exis-
tence, uniqueness, and several other properties of some critical µ values.
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Lemma 3. For any i ∈ {1, 2} and c ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique µi(c) ∈ (0, 1)
such that
piSi (c, µi(c)) = pi
C
i (c). (28)
It is also true that µ1(c) is always decreasing in c whereas µ2(c) is always in-
creasing. Moreover, µ1(0) = µ2(0) and µ1(c) < µ2(c) for any c ∈ (0, 1].
Using Lemma 3, we can make the following comparisons.
Theorem 2. Given any c ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], the disagreement payoffs of
each duopolist at the disagreement points piS(c, µ) and piC(c) can be compared
as follows:
piS1 (c, µ) < pi
C
1 (c) and pi
S
2 (c, µ) < pi
C
2 (c) if 0 ≤ µ < µ1(c),
piS1 (c, µ) = pi
C
1 (c) and pi
S
2 (c, µ) < pi
C
2 (c) if µ = µ1(c),
piS1 (c, µ) > pi
C
1 (c) and pi
S
2 (c, µ) < pi
C
2 (c) if µ1(c) < µ < µ2(c),
piS1 (c, µ) > pi
C
1 (c) and pi
S
2 (c, µ) = pi
C
2 (c) if µ = µ2(c),
piS1 (c, µ) > pi
C
1 (c) and pi
S
2 (c, µ) > pi
C
2 (c) if µ2(c) < µ ≤ 1.
(29)
Theorem 2 implies that in any bargaining situation where bargaining fails
and the disagreement payoffs are realized, both firms in the cartel would regret
if they had agreed, before the bargaining takes place, on the disagreement point
piC(c) instead of piS(c, µ) (on the disagreement point piS(c, µ) instead of piC(c))
provided that the demand uncertainty is sufficiently high (sufficiently low) with
respect to the cost asymmetry.
Figure 1 illustrates our findings in Theorem 2. Note that µ2(c) is the curve
separating the purple and blue colored areas respectively at the top and the
middle of the figure whereas µ1(c) is the curve separating the blue and yellow
colored areas respectively at the middle and the bottom. One can see that an
increase in the cost parameter c increases µ2(c) and decreases µ1(c), raising the
difference µ2(c)−µ1(c) or widening the blue colored region towards the right. In
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situations where the uncertainty parameter µ is random, the rise in µ2(c)−µ1(c)
would imply an increase in the likelihood that piS(c, µ) and piC(c) are Pareto
non-comparable. On the other hand, as we can see in the purple (yellow) colored
region the disagreement welfares of both firms in the duopolistic cartel are higher
(lower) at piS(c, µ) than at piC(c) if the demand uncertainty is sufficiently high
(low).
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Figure 1. The effects of µ and c on the Pareto comparison of the
disagreement points piS(c, µ) and piC(c).
Hereafter, we will study the agreement payoffs obtained by the duopolistic
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firms when the disagreement point is either piS(c, µ) or piC(c). We will first
consider the simple case of symmetric costs, i.e., c = 0. It should be clear from
(8), (9), and (14) that piS1 (0, µ) = pi
S
2 (0, µ) for any µ ∈ [0, 1] and piC1 (0) = piC2 (0).
These equalities trivially imply that if there is no cost asymmetry, then irre-
spective of the size of the demand uncertainty the duopolistic firms will always
share the collusion profits equally, both when the solution splits the gains from
agreement equally and when it splits them d-proportionally regardless whether
the disagreement point is obtained from the equilibrium of the supply function
or the quantity competition.
Theorem 3. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to either the Equal Split
solution or the d-Proportional Split solution on Σ2,D+ . If there is no cost asym-
metry in the industry (c = 0), then for any µ ∈ [0, 1] and d ∈ {piS(0, µ), piC(0)},
the collusion profits are split equally under the solution F , i.e., Fi(S(0, µ), d) =
piI(0, µ)/2 for any i ∈ {1, 2}.
In the rest of our paper, we will be interested in the more involving case of
asymmetric costs, i.e., c ∈ (0, 1]. The below lemma will shorten our analysis
substantially. In the proof of many results, after ensuring some payoff compari-
son for firm 1, we will use Lemma 4 to simply infer the relevant comparison for
firm 2.
Lemma 4. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to either the Equal Split
solution or the d-Proportional Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Then, for any c ∈ (0, 1],
µ ∈ [0, 1], and d, d′ ∈ S(c, µ), we have Fi(S(c, µ), d) > Fi(S(c, µ), d′) if and only
if Fj(S(c, µ), d) < Fj(S(c, µ), d
′) for any i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i.
Now, we can start studying solutions that split the gains from agreement
equally.
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Lemma 5. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to the Equal Split so-
lution on Σ2,D+ . For any c ∈ (0, 1], µ ∈ [0, 1], and d, d′ ∈ S(c, µ), we have
Fi(S(c, µ), d) > Fi(S(c, µ), d
′) if and only if di−dj > d′i−d′j for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}
with j 6= i.
Using Lemma 5, we will next show that if the bargaining solution splits the
gains from agreement equally, then the bargaining payoff of the more efficient
firm in the cartel is always higher when the disagreement point is piS than when
it is piC , while the opposite is true for the payoff of the less efficient firm.
Theorem 4. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to the Equal Split solu-
tion on Σ2,D+ . Then for any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], we have F1(S(c, µ), piS(c, µ))
> F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) and F2(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) < F2(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)).
To see why Theorem 4 is true, we should note by Lemma 2 that the payoff
difference piS1 (c, µ) − piS2 (c, µ) is always higher than piC1 (c) − piC2 (c) when there
is cost asymmetry. Then, using Lemma 5, one can simply show that for any
solution F that splits the gains from agreement equally, F1(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ))
must be higher than F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)). A negative implication of Theorem 4
is that any size of cost asymmetry would always lead to a conflict between the
duopolistic firms regarding whether –in a pre-bargaining stage– they should set
the disagreement point to piS(c, µ) or piC(c). The firms may resolve this conflict
if they manage to agree upon an alternative disagreement point which is compro-
mising for both of them. A natural candidate for such a point may be a weighted
average of piS(c, µ) and piC(c), i.e., the point piω(c, µ) = ωpiS(c, µ)+(1−ω)piC(c)
where ω ∈ (0, 1). Note that the allocation piω(c, µ) lies in S(c, µ) because S(c, µ)
is convex.
Corollary 1. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to the Equal Split
solution on Σ2,D+ . Then for any c ∈ (0, 1], µ ∈ [0, 1], and ω ∈ (0, 1), we have
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F1(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) > F1(S(c, µ), pi
ω(c, µ)) > F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) and F2(S(c, µ),
piS(c, µ)) < F2(S(c, µ), pi
ω(c, µ)) < F2(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)).
Corollary 1 shows that when the bargaining solution splits the gains from
agreement equally, the disagreement point piω becomes, for any ω ∈ (0, 1), al-
ways superior to each firm’s worst alternative in {piC , piS} and always inferior
to each firm’s best alternative in the same set, always implying some degree
of compromise for both firms. We should also note that the higher the weight
parameter ω, the higher the agreement payoff of firm 1 and the lower the agree-
ment payoff of firm 2, pointing to a new conflict between the two firms as to the
determination of ω. Definitely, there is no way to predict which value of ω the
firms would select. However, if they can agree upon choosing their bargaining
solution under some form of symmetry condition leading to a solution split-
ting the gains from agreement equally, it might not be unreasonable to assume
that they could impose a similar condition of symmetry also when they have to
bargain over the parameter ω ∈ (0, 1), leading to the disagreement point pi1/2,
which is the equally weighted average of piS and piC at all parameter values.
Now, we will consider bargaining solutions that split the gains from agree-
ment in any bargaining problem d-proportionally.
Theorem 5. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to the d-Proportional
Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Then for any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], F1(S(c, µ), piS(c, µ))
> F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) and F2(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) < F2(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)).
Theorem 5 shows that when the bargaining solution splits the gains from
agreement proportionally respecting the relative payoffs at the disagreement
point, the more efficient firm always prefers –with respect to the induced agree-
ment payoffs– the disagreement point piS to the disagreement point piC , while
the opposite is true for the less efficient firm. Recall that the same conclusion
was also reached in Theorem 4, where the bargaining solution splits the gains
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from agreement equally. We should also observe that both in Theorem 4 and in
Theorem 5, we have picked and fixed a bargaining solution and then compared
the agreement payoffs of the duopolistic firms induced by the disagreement
points piS and piC . These two theorems together imply that the preferences of
the duopolistic firms over piS and piC are not affected by whether the gains from
agreement are split equally or d-proportionally. But, there remains a question
we have not answered yet. Which of the two solutions, considered in Theorems 4
and 5, would be preferred by the more efficient firm, or the less efficient firm, in
the cartel if the disagreement point were fixed at either piS or piC? The answer
to this question will be implied by the following theorem that builds a bridge
between the results in Theorems 4 and 5.
Theorem 6. Let F d−PS and FES be bargaining solutions on Σ2+ that respec-
tively reduce to the d-Proportional Split solution and the Equal Split solution
on Σ2,D+ . Then, for any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), piC(c)) >
FES1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) and F d−PS2 (S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) < FES2 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)).
We know from Theorem 2 that in cases where the size of demand uncertainty
is sufficiently large, the disagreement payoff of the more efficient firm is always
lower at piC than at piS . However, even in such cases it is true –by Theorem 6–
that the more efficient firm prefers a bargaining environment where the disagree-
ment point is piC and the gains from agreement are split d-proportionally to an
environment where the disagreement point is piS and the gains from agreement
is split equally. Theorems 4, 5, and 6 together allow us to observe the following.
Corollary 2. Let F d−PS and FES be bargaining solutions on Σ2+ that respec-
tively reduce to the d-Proportional Split solution and the Equal Split solution on
Σ2,D+ . Then, for any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1],
F d−PS1 (S, pi
S) > F d−PS1 (S, pi
C) > FES1 (S, pi
S) > FES1 (S, pi
C), and
F d−PS2 (S, pi
S) < F d−PS2 (S, pi
C) < FES2 (S, pi
S) < FES2 (S, pi
C)
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where S = S(c, µ), piS = piS(c, µ), and piC = piC(c).
To summarize the findings we have obtained so far, consider at each c ∈ [0, 1]
and µ ∈ [0, 1], the set of bargaining environments
E(c, µ) = {(F d−PS , piS(c, µ)), (F d−PS , piC(c)), (FES , piS(c, µ)), (FES , piC(c))},
where each environment involves a bargaining solution and a disagreement point
we have studied. To compare the environments in E(c, µ) for the duopolistic
firms, we can define their preference relations. Given any (F, d) and (F ′, d′)
where F and F ′ are bargaining solutions on Σ2+ and d, d
′ ∈ S(c, µ), we say
that in terms of the induced agreement payoffs firm i prefers (F, d) to (F ′, d′),
denoted by (F, d) i (F ′, d′), if and only if Fi(S(c, µ), d) > F ′i (S(c, µ), d′) and
firm i is indifferent between (F, d) and (F ′, d′), denoted by (F, d) ∼i (F ′, d′), if
and only if Fi(S(c, µ), d) = F
′
i (S(c, µ), d
′).
Given the above definitions, Theorem 3 implies that in case c = 0, firm
i = 1, 2 has the preference ordering
(F d−PS , piS) ∼i (F d−PS , piC) ∼i (FES , piS) ∼i (FES , piC) (30)
at any µ ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, Corollary 2 implies the following orderings
(F d−PS , piS) 1 (F d−PS , piC) 1 (FES , piS) 1 (FES , piC) (31)
(FES , piC) 2 (FES , piS) 2 (F d−PS , piC) 2 (F d−PS , piS) (32)
for any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1].
The preference orderings above show that in situations where the firms in the
duopolistic cartel restrict themselves at any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1] to the set of
bargaining environments in E(c, µ), the more efficient firm would desire to be in
the environment (F d−PS , piS(c, µ)), which is the worst environment for the less
efficient firm. Oppositely, the best environment in E(c, µ) from the viewpoint of
the less efficient firm, namely (FES , piC(c)), is the worst environment according
to the more efficient firm, pointing to a conflict of choice between the two firms.
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The firms may resolve this conflict by using a disagreement point, pi1/2(c, µ),
which averages piC(c) and piS(c, µ), along with a moderating solution FM on
Σ2+ that will equally split for the two firms the sum of payoffs generated by
(F d−PS , piS(c, µ)) and (FES , piC(c)), i.e.,
FMi (S(c, µ), pi
1/2(c, µ))=
1
2
(
F d−PSi (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ))+FESi (S(c, µ), pi
C(c))
)
(33)
for any i ∈ {1, 2}. We should observe that for any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], the
environment (FM , pi1/2(c, µ)) lies in the preference ordering of each firm between
the most desirable and the least desirable environments in E(c, µ), since we have
(F d−PS , piS(c, µ)) 1 (FM , pi1/2(c, µ)) 1 (FES , piC(c)) (34)
and
(FES , piC(c)) 2 (FM , pi1/2(c, µ)) 2 (F d−PS , piS(c, µ)). (35)
Having noted that (FM , pi1/2(c, µ)) may be a plausible bargaining environ-
ment, we wonder whether its outcome can be more desirable for any of the
duopolistic firms in comparison to the division of collusion profits in the ab-
sence of bargaining, as considered by Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita’s (2012). Re-
call from (19) that when there is no bargaining, firm i = 1, 2 obtains a cost-based
share of collusion profits, amounting piS−Coli (c, µ) = (1− θi(c))piI(c, µ)/2. Since
this payoff must also be attainable when bargaining is possible, we will –for
the sake of notational harmony– define for every c and µ in [0, 1], a bargaining
environment (FS−Col, piS−Col(c, µ)), where FS−Col is a solution on Σ2+ such
that
FS−Col(S(c, µ), piS−Col(c, µ)) = piS−Col(c, µ). (36)
Since piS−Col(c, µ) ∈WP (S(c, µ)), FS−Col can be any solution on Σ2+ as long as
it satisfies on Σ2,L+ an axiom of individual rationality requiring that the solution
must not be below the disagreement point in any bargaining set.
Theorem 7. Let F d−PS and FES be bargaining solutions on Σ2+ that respec-
tively reduce to the d-Proportional Split solution and the Equal Split solution on
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Σ2,D+ . Then for any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], FS−Col1 (S(c, µ), piS−Col(c, µ)) >
F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) and FS−Col2 (S(c, µ), pi
S−Col(c, µ)) < F d−PS2 (S(c, µ),
piS(c, µ)).
Theorem 7 and Corollary 2 together imply that for all values of c ∈ (0, 1] and
µ ∈ [0, 1], the collusion payoff obtained by the more efficient firm in the cartel
when bargaining (with side payments) is not possible is above the highest payoff
this firm can expect to gain in any bargaining environment of E(c, µ). On the
other hand, even the lowest payoff the less efficient firm can expect to obtain
in E(c, µ) is higher than its collusion payoff in the absence of bargaining. These
results allow us to compare for each firm the payoff obtained in the absence of
bargaining with the payoff obtained in the bargaining environment (FM , pi1/2).
We find that in this moderating environment (only) the more efficient firm in
the cartel would wish that the cartel did not have the bargaining possibility.
Corollary 3. Let F d−PS and FES be bargaining solutions on Σ2+ that respec-
tively reduce to the d-Proportional Split solution and the Equal Split solution
on Σ2,D+ . Then for any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1], FS−Col1 (S(c, µ), piS−Col(c, µ))
> FM1 (S(c, µ), pi
1/2(c, µ)) and FS−Col2 (S(c, µ), pi
S−Col(c, µ)) < FM2 (S(c, µ),
pi1/2(c, µ)).
So far, we have considered the rankings of the agreement payoffs in various
bargaining environments. One may also wonder how the sizes of these agree-
ment payoffs are affected from the changes in the cost asymmetry and demand
uncertainty. To explore this, in Figure 2 we plot the bargaining payoff of the
more efficient firm in the cartel as a share of collusion profits under all bargain-
ing environments studied in this paper. The value of µ2, the variance of the
demand uncertainty, is set to 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1 in panels (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv),
respectively. Comparing all panels, we observe that the welfare of the more effi-
cient firm in the cartel (and consequently the welfare of the less efficient firm) is
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more sensitive to the variations in the bargaining solution and the disagreement
point when the demand uncertainty is higher.
Note that in Figure 2 the orange curve represents the bargaining payoff of
the more efficient firm –as a share of the collusion profits– in the bargaining
environment (F d−PS , piS(c, µ)), the most desirable environment for this firm
in E(c, µ). The only curve above the orange curve is the black curve which
represents the share of collusion profits the more efficient firm in the cartel can
secure when bargaining with side payments is not possible. Also note that the
profit shares of the more efficient and the less efficient firm always sum up to
1. Therefore, the significantly positive distance between the black and orange
curves at medium to large sizes of cost symmetry implies that the possibility
of bargaining may increase the welfare of the less efficient firm in the cartel
substantially even when it has to bargain in its least desirable environment in
E(c, µ), namely (F d−PS , piS(c, µ)).
Comparing the four graphs in Figure 2, we also observe that an increase
in the level of demand uncertainty increases at all cost levels the distance be-
tween the orange and gray lines, widening the size of the payoff conflict between
the duopolistic firms whenever they restrict themselves to choose a bargaining
environment from the set of alternatives E(c, µ). Regarding this conflict, our
remedy, suggesting the use of the bargaining environment (FM , pi1/2(c, µ), gen-
erates agreement payoffs represented by the red curve. Note that by definition,
the payoffs represented by the red curve are obtained by taking the average of
the payoffs obtained under (F d−PS , piS(c, µ)) and (FES , piC(c)), that is why the
red curve always lies below the orange curve but above the gray curve. In fact,
if µ2 is equal to 1/3 or higher as in panels (ii)-(iv), the red curve always stays
under all other curves except for the gray curve, implying that the bargaining
environment we have suggested dominates for the less efficient firm all bargain-
ing environments in the set E(c, µ), except for its favorite environment, namely
(FES , piC(c)).
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Figure 2. The payoff of firm 1 as a share of collusion profits in various
bargaining environments.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have dealt with the basic problem of a duopolistic cartel re-
garding how to divide up collusion profits. We have borrowed the structures of
our duopolistic industry from Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita’s (2012), who studied
the formation (and also stability) of duopolistic collusion under cost asymmetry
and demand uncertainty. However, differing from Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita’s
(2012) approach to the problem, we have allowed duopolistic firms to coopera-
tively bargain with side payments over collusion profits.
Using the bargaining model of Nash (1950), we have identified for our duopolis-
tic cartel, a bargaining set of payoffs, a disagreement point in this set –to be
realized only if the bargaining fails– and a solution that selects a point inside the
bargaining set possibly taking the disagreement point into consideration. More
specifically, we have defined – for each demand and cost realization– all possible
divisions of the collusion profits as the bargaining set of the cartel. We have
assumed that these collusion profits are always obtained from the joint profit
maximization program of the cartel, employing supply functions as production
strategies instead of fixed quantities, since the former option yields higher ex-
pected profits as long as there is any size of demand uncertainty, as was earlier
shown by Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita’s (2012).
Given the bargaining set of the cartel, we have set the disagreement point
to either the payoff allocation at the (Cournot) Nash equilibrium in quantities,
piC , or the payoff allocation at the Nash equilibrium in supply functions, piS .
As for bargaining solutions, we have restricted ourselves mainly to those that
split the cartel’s total gains from agreement either equally or proportionally
with respect to the ratio of the disagreement payoffs. We have called these two
classes of solutions, within the domain of duopolistic bargaining problems, the
Equal Split solution and the d-Proportional Split solution, respectively.
In our first result, Theorem 1, we have showed that under the possibility of
bargaining each firm in the duopolistic industry has incentive to join a collu-
sive agreement if the bargaining solution splits the gains from agreement either
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equally or d-proportionally and the disagreement point is obtained from the
equilibrium of either the supply function competition or the quantity compe-
tition. Our result is partially different from the earlier result of Ciarreta and
Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012) –obtained in the absence of bargaining possibility– show-
ing that when the collusive outcome is allocated between the firms to equalize
their marginal costs, the more efficient firm is always willing to collude both
under quantity competition and supply function competition, whereas the less
efficient firm is willing to collude only if the cost asymmetry is sufficiently small.
Our second result, Theorem 2, compares the disagreement payoffs of each
firm at the two disagreement points considered throughout the paper. Basically,
this result shows that both firms in the cartel have higher (lower) disagreement
payoffs at piC than at piS only if the demand uncertainty is sufficiently low (high).
If the demand uncertainty is intermediate, then in terms of the disagreement
payoff the more efficient firm may prefer the disagreement point piS to piC , while
the opposite would be true for the less efficient firm.
Our other findings are related to agreement payoffs. In Theorem 3 we have
simply showed that when there is no cost asymmetry, the duopolists always
share the collusion profits equally, both when the solution splits the gains from
agreement equally and when it splits them d-proportionally regardless whether
the disagreement point is piS or piC . In the subsequent results we have dealt
with the case of asymmetric costs. Theorem 4 shows that under any solution
that splits the gains from agreement equally the more efficient firm in the cartel
always has a higher agreement payoff when the disagreement point is piS than
when the disagreement point is piC , whereas the opposite is true for the less
efficient firm, pointing to a possible conflict of choice between the two firms.
We have suggested that this conflict can be moderated if the duopolistic firms
set the disagreement point to a weighted average of piC and piS . Corollary 1
shows that by using this moderation, instead of setting the disagreement point
to either piC or piS , it is always possible to reduce the payoff difference of the
duopolistic firms.
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In Theorem 5, we have extended our result in Theorem 4 to show that
the more efficient firm in the cartel prefers the disagreement point piS to piC
when the bargaining solution splits the gains from agreement d-proportionally,
as well. This result holds because the disagreement payoff of the more efficient
firm relative to the disagreement payoff of the less efficient firm is always higher
at piS than at piC , irrespective of the sizes of the demand uncertainty and the
cost asymmetry.
In Theorem 6, we have constructed a bridge between the results of Theorems
4 and 5 to show that the more efficient firm prefers a bargaining environment
where the disagreement point is piC and the gains from agreement are split d-
proportionally to an environment where the disagreement point is piS and the
gains from agreement is split equally. We should note that none of the results in
Theorems 4, 5, and 6 can be trivially predicted. On the other hand, these three
theorems together lead to a predictable conclusion in Corollary 2, implying that
the more efficient firm in the cartel always prefers, with respect to the induced
agreement payoffs, a solution with d-proportional splitting to a solution with
equal splitting regardless whether the disagreement point is obtained from the
supply function or the quantity competition.
Finally, in Theorem 7 we have showed that the highest agreement payoff that
can be obtained by the more efficient firm in the cartel under any bargaining
solution and disagreement point studied in our paper is always below than the
share of collusion profits this firm can receive when the collusive agreement
equalizes the marginal costs of the duopolistic firms as proposed by Patinkin
(1947). Oppositely, the less efficient firm in the cartel always becomes better off
when the firms can use their relative bargaining powers to divide up collusion
profits as suggested by Bain (1948).
We should note that the bargaining solutions we have considered may be
among plausible alternatives for the duopolists. As a matter of fact, the bar-
gaining solutions that split the duopolists’ gains from agreement equally may be
very rich, also including many well-known solutions for two-person bargaining
27
problems. Besides, the disagreement points we have considered may be among
the most natural candidates to represent status quo payoffs. Thus, we believe
that the bargaining environments studied in this paper are theoretically sound.
On the other hand, we also acknowledge that there may exist other meaningful
alternatives, as well. For example, one may include into our set of bargaining
environments, environments where the disagreement point is obtained from the
equilibrium of Bertrand (1883) competition in prices, the third type of com-
petition studied by Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2012) under cost asymmetry
and demand uncertainty. However, we are also aware that irrespective from the
theoretical completeness or soundness of our model, it is an empirical question
whether the duopolists could manage to collude and how they would divide the
industry profits in case they collude. For an asymmetric Cournot duopoly these
questions were recently studied by Fischer and Normann (2017) in an experi-
mental work, with a focus on the role of explicit communication on collusion. We
believe that future research may extend their work to our duopolistic bargaining
model where the duopolists are allowed, in the possibility of any disagreement,
to compete in either quantities or supply functions.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Pick any c ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. First, consider the
point piS(c, µ). We know from equations (8) and (9) that piS(c, µ) > 0. Also,
equations (2), (9), and (18) imply that piI(c, µ) > piS1 (c, µ)+pi
S
2 (c, µ) if and only
if
1 + µ2
5− c2 >
1 + µ2
2
(
9− c2
v(c)
− 1
)
, (37)
implying
(7− c2)2 v2(c) > [45− c2(14− c2)]2. (38)
Using equation (8), the above inequality can be reduced to
(7− c2)2 > 45− c2(14− c2), (39)
which can be easily checked to be true. Hence, piI(c, µ) > piS1 (c, µ) + pi
S
2 (c, µ).
Now, consider the point piC(c). Equation (14) implies that piC(c) > 0. Also,
equations (2), (14), and (18) imply that piI(c, µ) > piC1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c) if and only if
1 + µ2
5− c2 >
12− c2
(8− c2)2 , (40)
implying
(1 + µ2)(64− 16c2 + c4) > (60− 17c2 + c4), (41)
which can be easily checked to be true. Therefore, piI(c, µ) > piC1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c).
Thus, we have proved that for any d ∈ {piS(c, µ), piC(c)}, 0 < d1 +d2 < piI(c, µ),
implying d ∈ S(c, µ) and d /∈WP (S(c, µ)). 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to either
the Equal Split solution or the d-Proportional Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any
i ∈ {1, 2}, c ∈ [0, 1], µ ∈ [0, 1], and d ∈ {piS(c, µ), piC(µ)}. Then, (25), (26), and
(27) imply that
Fi(S(c, µ), d)− di = ki(d)[piI(c, µ)− d1 − d2] (42)
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for some ki(d) ∈ (0, 1) such that ki(d) = 1/2 if F reduces to the Equal Split
solution on Σ2,D+ and ki(d) = φi(d) if F reduces to the d-Proportional Split so-
lution on Σ2,D+ . By Lemma 1, d /∈WP (S(c, µ)), implying piI(c, µ)−d1−d2 > 0.
Then, equation (42) implies Fi(S(c, µ), d)− di > 0. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Pick any c ∈ [0, 1] and µ in [0, 1]. Using (2) and (9) we
obtain
piS1 (c, µ)− piS2 (c, µ) = c
(
1 + µ2
2
)(
1− 5− c
2
v(c)
)
. (43)
On the other hand, using (2) and (14) we obtain
piC1 (c)− piC2 (c) =
c
8− c2 . (44)
First note that piS1 (c, µ) − piS2 (c, µ) = piC1 (c) − piC2 (c) = 0 if c = 0. This implies
piS1 (c, µ) − piC1 (c) = piS2 (c, µ) − piC2 (c) if c = 0. Now, consider the case where
c ∈ (0, 1]. Considering (43) and (44) when µ = 0, we observe that piS1 (c, 0) −
piS2 (c, 0) > pi
C
1 (c)− piC2 (c) if and only if
1
2
[
1− 5− c
2
v(c)
]
>
1
8− c2 , (45)
implying
v(c) >
(5− c2)(8− c2)
(6− c2) . (46)
Inserting (8) into the above inequality and taking the square of both sides yield
45− c2(1− c2) > (5− c
2)2(8− c2)2
(6− c2)2 , (47)
which can be easily checked to be true. Moreover, since piS1 (c, µ)−piS2 (c, µ) is in-
creasing in µ, we have piS1 (c, µ)−piS2 (c, µ) > piS1 (c, 0)−piS2 (c, 0) for any µ ∈ (0, 1].
This implies that for any µ ∈ [0, 1], we have piS1 (c, µ)−piS2 (c, µ) > piC1 (c)−piC2 (c),
further implying piS1 (c, µ)− piC1 (c) > piS2 (c, µ)− piC2 (c), completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3. We can check that the difference piS1 (c, 0)−piC1 (c) reaches
its minimal value (−0.00833) at c = 0, its maximal value (−0.00690) at c = 1,
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and it is increasing everywhere on [0, 1]. On the other, the difference piS2 (c, 0)−
piC2 (c) reaches its maximal value (−0.00833) at c = 0, its minimal value (-
0.01049) at c = 1, and it is decreasing everywhere on [0, 1]. So, for any i ∈ {1, 2}
and c ∈ [0, 1], we have piSi (c, 0)− piCi (c) < 0, implying µi(c) 6= 0.
Now, we check that the difference piS1 (c, 1)−piC1 (c) reaches its minimal value
(0.07707) at c = 0, its maximal value (0.16988) at c = 1, and it is increasing
everywhere on [0, 1]. On the other, the difference piS2 (c, 1) − piC2 (c) reaches its
maximal value (0.07707) at c = 0, its minimal value (0.01984) at c = 1, and it
is decreasing everywhere on [0, 1]. So, for any i ∈ {1, 2} and c ∈ [0, 1], we have
piSi (c, 1)− piCi (c) > 0, implying µi(c) 6= 1.
So far, we have showed that µi(c) 6= 0, µi(c) 6= 1, piSi (c, 0)− piCi (c) < 0, and
piSi (c, 1) − piCi (c) > 0. Since for any i ∈ {1, 2} and c ∈ [0, 1], piSi (c, µ) − piCi (c)
is continuous in µ, there must exist some µi(c) ∈ (0, 1) such that piSi (c, µi(c))−
piCi (c) = 0. Above, we have also found that pi
S
1 (c, 0)−piC1 (c) is always increasing
in c and piS2 (c, 1) − piC2 (c) is always decreasing in c. Since for any i ∈ {1, 2},
piSi (c, µ) − piCi (c) is always increasing in µ, it must be true for any µ ∈ [0, 1]
that piS1 (c, µ) − piC1 (c) is always increasing in c and piS2 (c, µ) − piC2 (c) is always
decreasing in c. These results imply that µi(c) is unique for each i ∈ {1, 2} and
also that µ1(c) is decreasing whereas µ2(c) is increasing.
Finally, to prove the assertions regarding the comparison of µ1(c) and µ2(c),
consider first c = 0. Equation (28) implies piS1 (0, µ1(0)) − piC1 (0) = 0 and
piS2 (0, µ2(0))−piC2 (0) = 0, further implying piS1 (0, µ1(0))−piS2 (0, µ2(0)) = piC1 (0)−
piC2 (0). On the other hand, equation (44) implies pi
C
1 (0)−piC2 (0) = 0. So, we must
have piS1 (0, µ1(0))− piS2 (0, µ2(0)) = 0, as well. We can rewrite this last equality
as piS1 (0, µ1(0))− piS2 (0, µ1(0)) + piS2 (0, µ1(0))− piS2 (0, µ2(0)) = 0. We know from
equation (43) that piS1 (0, µ1(0))−piS2 (0, µ1(0)) = 0. Inserting this into the previ-
ous equality yields piS2 (0, µ1(0))− piS2 (0, µ2(0)) = 0. Since equations (8) and (9)
imply that piS2 (0, µ) is increasing in µ, the last equality above implies µ1(0) =
µ2(0). Now, let c ∈ (0, 1]. Lemma 2 implies piS1 (c, µ)−piC1 (c) > piS2 (c, µ)−piC2 (c)
for any µ ∈ [0, 1]. So, we must have piS1 (c, µ2(c))− piC1 (c) > piS2 (c, µ2(c))− piC2 (c)
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since µ2(c) ∈ (0, 1). Above, we can replace the difference piS2 (c, µ2(c)) − piC2 (c)
with piS1 (c, µ1(c))− piC1 (c) since both differences are zero by equation (28). This
would yield piS1 (c, µ2(c))−piC1 (c) > piS1 (c, µ1(c))−piC1 (c), implying µ2(c) > µ1(c)
since piS1 (c, µ) is always increasing in µ. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Pick any i ∈ {1, 2} and c ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemma 3, we
know that the value µi(c) is unique. Moreover, we know from (8), (9), and (14)
that piSi (c, µ)− piCi (c) is increasing in µ. Given equation (28), this implies that
piSi (c, µ)− piCi (c) > 0 if and only if µ > µi(c). (48)
By Lemma 3, we also know that µ1(0) = µ2(0) and µ1(c) < µ2(c) for any
c ∈ (0, 1], implying µ1(c) ≤ µ2(c) for any c ∈ [0, 1]. All of these facts imply that
(29) is true. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to either
the Equal Split solution or the d-Proportional Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any
µ ∈ [0, 1] and any d ∈ {piS(0, µ), piC(0)}. Equations (8), (9), and (14) imply
d1+d2 > 0 and d1 = d2. On the other hand, Lemma 1 implies d1+d2 < pi
I(0, µ).
If F reduces to the Equal Split solution on Σ2,D+ , then for each i ∈ {1, 2},
equation (25) implies that
Fi(S(0, µ), d) =
piI(0, µ)
2
+
d1 − d2
2
=
piI(0, µ)
2
. (49)
On the other hand, if F reduces to the d-Proportional Split solution on Σ2,D+ ,
then for each i ∈ {1, 2}, (26) and (27) imply that
Fi(S(0, µ), d) =
(
d1
d1 + d2
)
piI(0, µ) =
piI(0, µ)
2
. (50)
This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to either
the Equal Split solution or the d-Proportional Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Then,
equations (25), (26), and (27) imply that for any c ∈ (0, 1], µ ∈ [0, 1], and d, d′ ∈
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S(c, µ), we have F1(S(c, µ), d) + F2(S(c, µ), d) = pi
I(c, µ) and F1(S(c, µ), d
′) +
F2(S(c, µ), d
′) = piI(c, µ). Thus,
F1(S(c, µ), d)− F1(S(c, µ), d′) = − [F2(S(c, µ), d)− F2(S(c, µ), d′)] , (51)
implying that Fi(S(c, µ), d) > Fi(S(c, µ), d
′) if and only if Fj(S(c, µ), d) <
Fj(S(c, µ), d
′) for any i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to the Equal
Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any c ∈ (0, 1], µ ∈ [0, 1], d, d′ ∈ S(c, µ), and
i, j ∈ {1, 2} with j 6= i. Equation (25) implies that
Fi(S(c, µ), d) =
piI(c, µ)
2
+
di − dj
2
(52)
and
Fi(S(c, µ), d
′) =
piI(c, µ)
2
+
d′i − d′j
2
. (53)
Then, (52) and (53) imply
Fi(S(c, µ), d)− Fi(S(c, µ), d′) = (di − dj)
2
− (d
′
i − d′j)
2
. (54)
So, Fi(S(c, µ), d) > Fi(S(c, µ), d
′) if and only if di − dj > d′i − d′j . 
Proof of Theorem 4. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to the
Equal Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. Lemma
2 implies that piS1 (c, µ) − piS2 (c, µ) > piC1 (c) − piC2 (c). Then, Lemma 5 im-
plies F1(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) > F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)). By Lemma 4, we also have
F2(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) < F2(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)). 
Proof of Corollary 1. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to the Equal
Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any c ∈ (0, 1], µ ∈ [0, 1], and ω ∈ (0, 1). Equation
(25) implies that
F1(S(c, µ), pi
ω(c, µ)) =
piI(c, µ)
2
+
piω1 (c, µ)− piω2 (c, µ)
2
34
=
piI(c, µ)
2
+
(
ωpiS1 (c, µ) + (1− ω)piC1 (c)
2
)
−
(
ωpiS2 (c, µ) + (1− ω)piC2 (c)
2
)
= ω
(
piI(c, µ)
2
+
piS1 (c, µ)− piS1 (c, µ)
2
)
+
(1− ω)
(
piI(c, µ)
2
+
piC1 (c)− piC2 (c)
2
)
= ωF1(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) + (1− ω)F1(S(c, µ), piC(c)). (55)
Since we have F1(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) > F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) by Theorem 4, equa-
tion (55) and the assumption ω ∈ (0, 1) imply that F1(S(c, µ), piS(c, µ)) >
F1(S(c, µ), pi
ω(c, µ)) > F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)). Then, Lemma 4 implies F2(S(c, µ),
piS(c, µ)) < F2(S(c, µ), pi
ω(c, µ)) < F2(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)). 
Proof of Theorem 5. Let F be any solution on Σ2+ that reduces to the d-
Proportional Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. Equations
(8) and (9) imply piS1 (c, µ) +pi
S
2 (c, µ) > 0 whereas equation (14) implies pi
C
1 (c) +
piC2 (c) > 0. On the other hand, Lemma 1 implies that pi
S
1 (c, µ) + pi
S
2 (c, µ) <
piI(c, µ) and piC1 (c) +pi
C
2 (c) < pi
I(c, µ). Then, it follows from equations (26) and
(27) that
F1(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) =
(
piS1 (c, µ)
piS1 (c, µ) + pi
S
2 (c, µ)
)
piI(c, µ) (56)
and
F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) =
(
piC1 (c)
piC1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c)
)
piI(c, µ). (57)
So, F1(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) > F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) if and only if piS1 (c, µ)/pi
S
2 (c, µ)
> piC1 (c)/pi
C
2 (c), implying
(9− c2)− c(5− c2)− (1− c)v(c)
(9− c2) + c(5− c2)− (1 + c)v(c) >
(3− c)(2 + c)2
(3 + c)(2− c)2 , (58)
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using (9) and (14). After some algebra, one can show that the last inequality
holds if and only if
v(c)(10− c2)2 − (66− 17c2 + c4) > 0. (59)
Using (8), the left hand side of the above inequality can be reduced to 144 −
56c2 + 4c4, which is always positive since c ∈ (0, 1]. This proves that F1(S(c, µ),
piS(c, µ)) > F1(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)). Then, Lemma 4 implies that F2(S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ))
< F2(S(c, µ), pi
C(c)). 
Proof of Theorem 6. Let F d−PS and FES be bargaining solutions on Σ2+
that respectively reduce to the d-Proportional Split solution and the Equal
Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. Equation (14) implies
piC1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c) > 0, while Lemma 1 implies pi
C
1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c) < pi
I(c, µ). Then, it
follows from (26) and (27) that
F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) =
(
piC1 (c)
piC1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c)
)
piI(c, µ). (60)
On the other hand, (25) implies
FES1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) =
piI(c, µ)
2
+
piS1 (c, µ)− piS2 (c, µ)
2
. (61)
So, F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) > FES1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) if and only if
2
(
piC1 (c)
piC1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c)
− 1
2
)
>
piS1 (c, µ)− piS2 (c, µ)
piI(c, µ)
. (62)
We calculate
piS1 (c, µ)− piS2 (c, µ)
piI(c, µ)
= c
[
5− c2
2
] [
1− (5− c
2)
v(c)
]
(63)
using (18) and (43). On the other hand, we obtain
piC1 (c)
piC1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c)
=
(3− c)(2 + c)2
24− 2c2 , (64)
using (2) and (14). Hence, we have
2
(
piC1 (c)
piC1 (c) + pi
C
2 (c)
− 1
2
)
=
(3− c)(2 + c)2
12− c2 − 1 =
c(8− c2)
12− c2 . (65)
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Then, it is easy to check that
c(8− c2)
12− c2 > c
[
5− c2
2
] [
1− (5− c
2)
v(c)
]
(66)
for any c ∈ (0, 1]. This implies F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), piC(c)) > FES1 (S(c, µ), piS(c, µ)).
Then, Lemma 4 implies that F d−PS2 (S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) < FES2 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)). 
Proof of Corollary 2. Let F d−PS and FES be bargaining solutions on Σ2+
that respectively reduce to the d-Proportional Split solution and the Equal Split
solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we have
F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) > F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) by Theorem 5,
F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) > FES1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) by Theorem 6,
FES1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) > FES1 (S(c, µ), pi
C(c)) by Theorem 4.
The three inequalities together imply for firm 1 the payoff comparisons in the
corollary. Then, Lemma 4 implies the payoff comparisons for firm 2. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Let F d−PS and FES be bargaining solutions on Σ2+
that respectively reduce to the d-Proportional Split solution and the Equal Split
solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that (8) and (9) imply
piS1 (c, µ) +pi
S
2 (c, µ) > 0 whereas Lemma 1 implies pi
S
1 (c, µ) +pi
S
2 (c, µ) < pi
I(c, µ).
Then, using (2), (19), and (36) together with (26) and (27) we observe that
FS−Col1 (S(c, µ), pi
S−Col(c, µ)) > F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) if and only if(
1 + c
2
)
piI(c, µ) >
(
piS1 (c, µ)
piS1 (c, µ) + pi
S
2 (c, µ)
)
piI(c, µ), (67)
implying
1 + c
1− c >
piS1 (c, µ)
piS2 (c, µ)
. (68)
Given equation (9), the inequality in (68) becomes
1 + c
1− c >
(9− c2)− c(5− c2)− (1− c)v(c)
(9− c2) + c(5− c2)− (1 + c)v(c) . (69)
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After some algebra, we can show that the above inequality holds if and only if
(14− 2c2)2 − 4[v(c)]2 > 0. (70)
Using (8), the left hand side of the above inequality can be reduced to
(196− 56c2 + 4c4)− (180− 56c2 + 4c4) = 16, (71)
which is greater than zero. Thus, we have FS−Col1 (S(c, µ), pi
S−Col(c, µ)) >
F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)). Then, Lemma 4 implies FS−Col2 (S(c, µ), pi
S−Col(c, µ))
< F d−PS2 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)). 
Proof of Corollary 3. Let F d−PS and FES be bargaining solutions on
Σ2+ that respectively reduce to the d-Proportional Split solution and the Equal
Split solution on Σ2,D+ . Pick any c ∈ (0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]. Theorem 7 implies
that FS−Col1 (S(c, µ), pi
S−Col(c, µ)) > F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)). On the other
hand, Corollary 2 and equation (33) imply that F d−PS1 (S(c, µ), pi
S(c, µ)) >
FM1 (S(c, µ), pi
1/2(c, µ)). Therefore, FS−Col1 (S(c, µ), pi
S−Col(c, µ)) > FM1 (S(c, µ),
pi1/2(c, µ)). Then, Lemma 4 implies FS−Col2 (S(c, µ), pi
S−Col(c, µ)) < FM2 (S(c, µ),
pi1/2(c, µ)). 
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